Suchergebnisse

Liberal thinkers' use of the notion of reasonableness as a means of creating an inclusive concept of justice in pluralistic societies is considered. An overview of contemporary thought that comprehends justice as impartiality is presented to illustrate such thinkers' attempt to account for the concept of reasonable justice. Two problems that arise in liberal thinkers' attempt to define reasonableness are then identified, eg, the absence of a definition of reasonableness heretofore. Three functions of the reasonable are subsequently identified in order to reveal how reasonableness should work within democratic societies: (1) a criterion of inclusion & exclusion; (2) a foundation for moral incentives to create justice; & (3) a replacement for conflicting claims about moral truths. It is concluded that reasonable is neither universal nor neutral; nevertheless, it is stated that reasonableness can be neutral when engaged by individuals who are committed to democracy. 30 References. J. W. Parker

Liberal thinkers' use of the notion of reasonableness as a means of creating an inclusive concept of justice in pluralistic societies is considered. An overview of contemporary thought that comprehends justice as impartiality is presented to illustrate such thinkers' attempt to account for the concept of reasonable justice. Two problems that arise in liberal thinkers' attempt to define reasonableness are then identified, eg, the absence of a definition of reasonableness heretofore. Three functions of the reasonable are subsequently identified in order to reveal how reasonableness should work within democratic societies: (1) a criterion of inclusion & exclusion; (2) a foundation for moral incentives to create justice; & (3) a replacement for conflicting claims about moral truths. It is concluded that reasonable is neither universal nor neutral; nevertheless, it is stated that reasonableness can be neutral when engaged by individuals who are committed to democracy. 30 References. J. W. Parker

This article offers a response to Alex Bellamy's article 'Dirty Hands and Lesser Evils in the War on Terror'. It outlines deep errors in his claims about 'dirty hands' and 'lesser evils'. Essentially, these errors result from his failure to grapple with the complexity of dirty hands theory, coupled with his uncritical acceptance that dirty hands scenarios are essentially defined as a clash between a public and private morality. Furthermore, we argue that Bellamy's distinction between 'dirty hands' and 'lesser evils' is a spurious one since all dirty hands cases require a choice between lesser evils. In addition, we reject his claim that dirty hands makes no political sense. For illustrative purposes, we then briefly examine one problematic philosophical issue which needs attention if the notion of dirty hands is to be taken seriously. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of dirty hands by applying it to the issue of torture in the so-called 'war on terror'.

Abstract
The proportionality principle is an international humanitarian law requirement intended to constrain the use of military force in order to protect civilians in armed conflicts. This research experimentally assesses the reliability of its application by legal and moral experts (in 11 countries), by military officers (in two countries) and by laypeople. Reliability was evaluated according to three criteria: inter-expert convergence; sensitivity to relevant factors; and robustness – relative (lack of) susceptibility to biases. Unlike laypeople, experts and military officers performed well on the sensitivity criterion and manifested an appropriate understanding of the principle at the abstract level. However, both groups of experts failed to reach reasonable judgment convergence. These findings cast doubt on the reliability of the protection provided to civilians during warfare, even when warring parties attempt to abide by the proportionality principle.